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Search theory is becoming the dominant paradigm in explaining micro- and macro- labour-
market phenomena, see Mortensen & Pissarides’ recent (1998, 1999) surveys. Examples
include the “ﬂows approach” to the study of labour markets and whether movements in
the Beveridge Curve inform discussions as to whether the labour market has become more
or less eﬀective over time (see, for example, Blanchard& Diamond(1989) Blanchard&
Diamond(1992) andDavis & Haltiwanger (1999)). Other policy issues are often d iscussed
in a search framework, see, for example, Manning’s recent (2001) discussion on labour-
market interventions andMarimon & Zilibotti (2000) on whether worksharing policy can
reduce unemployment. Of course, search theory has been central in modelling the impact
of beneﬁts on unemployment duration (including Lancaster (1979), Meyer (1990), and
many studies in between) and what causes long-term unemployment (Jackman, Layard
& Pissarides 1989).
It is self-evident that search models are richer if they incorporate two-sided search, that of
workers searching for vacant jobs andof employers searching for unemployedworkers (or
possibly workers seeking to change jobs). Pissarides’ (2000) text (originally published in
1990) is seminal, andmight be contrastedwith Burd ett & Wright (1998). However, both
mod els, andothers like them, incorporate many of the same basic structures andassump-
tions. Burdett & Coles’s (1999) survey identiﬁes four key assumptions of search/matching
(SM) literature. The three that are relevant to labour markets are (i) Poisson arrival rates,
that is, the process that generates contacts between employers andworkers is a Poisson;
(ii) random matching, that is, if an employer contacts a worker, it is assumedhis id entity
is a random draw from all possible workers; and (iii) there exists an encounter function.
To quote Burdett & Coles (1999) directly: “deep in the heart of all SM models is ...an
encounterfunction...whichrelatesthenumbersofencountersperunitoftime[contacts]
as a function of [stocks of] unemployedworkers andvacancies”. In other word s, the en-
counter function is a production function that generates a ﬂow of contacts. If all contacts
leadto matches (hires), it is also the matching function. In the real world , andalso in
more andmore theoretical mod els that have heterogeneous agents, not all contacts lead
to matches and so the probability of a match is also modelled.
These three assumptions are deeply embedded in the SM literature. It is therefore im-
portant to establish whether they are observed in real world data. Most evidence is based
on aggregate/time series data, and estimates the matching function. Unfortunately such
data are not ideal. It is clearly much better to have micro-level data that distinguish
contacts andmatches, which is why very few stud ies have been able to estimate separate
contact andmatching probability functions. The same applies to the assumption of non-
1random matching. Non-random matching is almost exclusively associated with Melvyn
Coles andcollaborators, who provid es a very persuasive alternative view as to how agents
search andmatch with other. This is the stock-ﬂow matching model.1 But, again, it is
self-evident that micro-level data are required, where we are able to observe who contacts
whom, andwho eventually matches with whom.
T h eda t aw eh a v ea to u rdi s p o s a l ,f o raw e l l - de ﬁ n e d m a r k e tw h e r ew eo b s e r v e both sides of
the market, are ideal for examining these hypotheses. They refer to the youth labour mar-
ket in Lancashire, are collected as an administrative dataset used by Lancashire Careers
Service (LCS), between 1988 and1992. We observe every contact between those employ-
ers andjob seekers who usedthe Careers Service d uring the sample period , andfor each
contact we observe whether or not a successful match is made (approximately one-third
of all matches in the youth labour market). Job seekers in this database are not just the
unemployed, but also those in work, on a training scheme or in further education or at
school. A wide range of covariates for job seekers and vacancies are observed. We also ob-
serve the actual day on which hires are made, and so we can compute daily durations for
both the unemployedandvacancies. Nonetheless, these high frequency agent–level d ata
are superior to those hitherto usedfor investigating SM assumptions, especially stock–ﬂow
matching. In this particular paper, we estimate hazardfunctions for both (unemployed )
job-seekers andvacancies, using the same sample of matches. Decomposing the hazard
function into a matching probability andthe arrival rate of applicants is left to further
research.
The paper is organisedas follows: In the next section, we present stylisedversions of
both the random matching model and the stock-ﬂow matching model. This is developed
in to an estimable statistical model in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we describe in
some detail the data described immediately above and how they can be used to construct
the key variables in the stock-ﬂow matching model. Section 6 sets out the econometric
methodology and in Section 7 we discuss our results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we explain how the predictions of the stock–ﬂow matching model are
translatedinto speciﬁc econometric hypotheses. To set the scene, ﬁrst consid er a stylised
version of the random matching model. There are stocks of vacancies V andjob seekers U
(all of whom are assumedunemployed ) attempting to meet andeventually form matched
pairs. The rate at which they randomly contact each other per period is λ(U,V ), where
1The best exposition is Coles & Smith (1998), but also see Coles & Petrongolo (2001).
2λ() has the same properties as a production function (concave and increasing in both
arguments). If λ(U,V ) also exhibits constant returns to scale, the average number of
contacts per vacancy is
λ
e(θ)=λ/V = λ(U/V,1)
andis d ecreasing in labour-market tightness θ ≡ V/U. Similarly, the average number of
contacts per job seeker is
λ
w(θ)=λ/U = λ(1,V/U)






where µ is joint probability that a worker ﬁnds an employer acceptable and an employer
ﬁnds a worker acceptable. In some two-sided search models µ(θ) is an increasing function
in slack markets andthen becomes a d ecreasing function in tighter markets.
The aggregate matching (or hiring) function can be obtainedby aggregating either hazard







This shows how the matching function δ is d ecomposedinto the contact function andthe
matching probability. It will exhibit constant returns to scale if λ(θ) does the same.
There is a large microeconometric literature that has estimatedthe hazardout of unem-
ployment using unemployment duration data,2 but there is far less evidence for vacancies.3
Search in a stationary environment predicts that the hazard is constant, although most
estimated hazards show declining hazards. This is thought to be due to either some form
of negative duration dependence or unmodelled unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming the
latter can be controlledfor using appropriate econometric techniques (see below), d ura-
tion dependence can arise either because the arrival rate of suitable oﬀers falls and/or
the matching probability falls, as seen in decomposing the hazard in (1) above.4 Other
microeconometric studies do not estimate either hazard directly. Some have estimated
the hiring function δ(U,V ) directly5 or the matching probability6 or better still, have de-
2See van den Berg (1999, Footnote 1) for a recent list of contributions and surveys.
3See, for example, van Ours & Ridder (1991, 1992, 1993), Barron, Berger & Black (1997), Burdett &
Cunningham (1998), and Russo & van Ommeren (1998), Andrews, Bradley & Upward (2001a).
4See van Ours (1990) for vacancies and van den Berg (1990) for unemployment.
5See Lindeboom, van Ours & Renes (1994), Anderson & Burgess (1997), and Broersma & van Ours
(1999).
6See Teyssi` ere (1996) and Andrews, Bradley & Upward (2001b).
3composedthe hiring function into λ and µ (see equation 3).7 However, the great majority
of empirical work on the hiring function has usedaggregate time-series d ata. 8
The important feature of the random matching model is that it is a model that explicitly
allows for search/congestion externalities, which cannot be eliminatedby price ad just-
ments. By contrast, there is no congestion in Coles & Smith’s stock-ﬂow matching model,
as workers are able to search all of the market in a short periodof time, as are employ-
ers of workers. Unemployment andvacancies persist because suitable partners were not
available on this ﬁrst search of the market, andso workers/employers have to wait for
new opportunities to ﬂow into the market at a later date.
We now present a formal, albeit simpliﬁed, version of the stock-ﬂow matching model to
explain how the key predictions diﬀer from the model above. Time is made of up discrete
periods and agents arrive randomly, at a ﬂow rate of u for job seekers and v for vacancies.
In what follows, the possibility that two or more agents can arrive in a given periodcan
be ignored. As above, the matching probability is µ. In some periods, a single job seeker
will enter the market andwill examine the stock of ‘old ’ vacancies ¯ V (‘old’ in that they
were in the market in the previous period). This job seeker either does not match with
any of the stock of vacancies with probability (1−µ)
¯ V (andthe stock of ‘old ’ unemployed
¯ U increases by one in the next period) or he matches with one of the vacancies (andthe
s t o c ko f‘ o l d’¯ V decreases by one in the next period). Because of discounting, there is no
stock-stock matching between ¯ U and ¯ V ; hadthere been gains to trad e, pairs wouldhave
matchedin an earlier period . There is no ﬂow-ﬂow matching because two agents cannot
arrive together (but see below).
Thus the per-periodﬂow of job seekers out of the marketplace is mad e up of two types.
The ﬁrst type are the new job seekers, who arrive with ﬂow u andexit with probability
1 − (1 − µ)
¯ V. The secondtype are the oldunemployedjob seekers, who may match with
new vacancies, the latter arriving with ﬂow v. The arrival rate per unemployedjob seeker
is v/¯ U ( t h ea n a l o g u eo fλw above) andthe matching probability is 1 − (1 − µ)
¯ U rather
than µ above, (the product of which is the analogue of hw = λwµ). Aggregating over all
¯ U gives an outﬂow rate of v[1 − (1 − µ)
¯ U]. Adding the two ﬂow types together gives
δ(¯ U, ¯ V,u ,v)=u[1 − (1 − µ)
¯ V]+v[1 − (1 − µ)
¯ U]. (4)
Identical considerations for the vacancy outﬂow lead to exactly the same expression.
Equation (4) is the stock-ﬂow matching analogue of (3) above. It has increasing returns
to scale in ¯ U and ¯ V , but is non-homogeneous. However, the more important diﬀerence
is that it depends on the inﬂow rates u and v as well as the stocks ¯ U and ¯ V , where the
7See van Ours & Lindeboom (1996).
8See Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) for a comprehensive survey.
4stock of job-seekers and vacancies in the random matching model are given by:
U = u + ¯ UV = v + ¯ V.
For Coles & Smith this is the ﬁrst testable implication of stock-ﬂow matching.
The second testable implication concerns the hazards. Job seekers who match immediately
are only in the market for one period. Their hazard of exit 1 − (1 − µ)
¯ V is much bigger
than (v/¯ U)[1 − (1 − µ)
¯ U]a sv   ¯ V and u   ¯ U (andassuming that u = v and ¯ U = ¯ V
in steady state). The old job seekers remain in the market for much longer on average,
with average duration (¯ U/v)[1−(1−µ)
¯ U]−1 periods. This implies a step-wise hazard for
both job seekers and vacancies. Also, the ‘high’ hazard for new job-seekers depends on
u and ¯ V whereas the ‘low’ hazardfor oldjob seekers d epend s on v and ¯ U. T h i si st h e
thirdtestable implication. A fourth testable implication is that the matching probability
for those who fail to match immediately should actually be invariant to duration in the
market—older agents leave less quickly because they were unlucky, not because they
become less ‘attractive’. However, the assumption of no ﬂow-ﬂow matching is made
only for mathematical convenience, andin general we wouldexpect the hazard s/outﬂow
rates to also depend on v/u because of standard congestion arguments, as in the random
matching model above.
As noted above, there is almost no evidence on the stock–ﬂow matching model, unlike
for random matching. Coles & Smith (1998) present estimates of hw = δ(U,V,u,v)/U
using monthly aggregate time-series Job Centre data between 1987 and 1995, where they
observe U stratiﬁedby groupedd uration, total V , monthly inﬂows u and v andoutﬂows δ,
also stratiﬁedby groupedd uration. Their ﬁnd ings are strongly supportive of the theory.
Gregg & Petrongolo (1997) use similar data and come to similar conclusions. Coles &
Petrongolo (2001) have a recent interesting innovation to these two tests, using similar
data.
In the rest of this paper, we estimate worker andemployer hazard s to see which of the
random matching or stock-ﬂow matching models are better supported by the micro-level
data collected from Lancashire Careers Service. Estimates of the aggregate matching and
contact functions is left for future research.
3 A statistical model of non-random matching
In this section, we develop an estimable statistical model that incorporates most of the
features and predictions discussed above. Testable parametric restrictions that make the
random matching model a special case of the non-random matching model are a key
5feature of this model. However, Coles & Smith’s (1998) theory is amended to allow for
matches between oldjob-seekers andoldvacancies.
As above, the number of contacts per periodare generatedby
C ∼ Poisson[λ(U,V )]
where, for estimation purposes, we will use the standard Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
λ(U,V )=aUαV β. λ(U,V ) is the average number of contacts per period. In other
words, the contact function is “random”; pairs of agents of one type are no more/less
likely to contact each other than pairs of another type.
It is the matching probabilities, conditional on contacting, that are diﬀerent between
types of pair. These are given by9
µ11 if new job seeker, new vacancy
µ12 if new job seeker, oldvacancy
µ21 if oldjob seeker, new vacancy
µ22 if oldjob seeker, oldvacancy .
This allows the possibility that old-old matches can take place, even if there is stock-ﬂow
matching, but with a much lower probability. Note that new-new matches might be as
likely as both types of old/new matches.10 Random matching is a special case when
H0 : µ11 = µ12 = µ21 = µ22 (= µ, say), (5)




















¯ U ¯ V
UV
λ(U,V )=aµ22 ¯ U ¯ VU
α−1V
β−1. (9)
where each δij is the average number of matches of each type per period. Multiplying
λ(U,V )b yuv/UV,...,¯ U ¯ V/ UV splits the average number by type, which is then multi-
pliedby the matching probability. Note that old -oldcontacts are relatively very frequent
9We make use of this subscript i,j notation throughout: i always refers to job-seekers and “1” always
means new.
10Coles & Petrongolo (2001) allow for one-sided stock-ﬂow matching, which is their eﬃciency wage
model.One can model this by specifying µ12  = µ21,o rθ  =1 ,o rb o t h .
6by the sheer numbers of oldstocks ¯ U and ¯ V . It is the matching probability that makes
old -oldmatches less frequent, andwouldbe zero in the pure stock-ﬂow matching mod el.
The aggregate matching function sums the four δijs. Under H0, this aggregate matching
function is given by
δ = µ
[uv + u¯ V + ¯ Uv+ ¯ U ¯ V ]
UV
λ(U,V )=µλ(U,V ), (10)
that is, generates Equation (3) above, except that here µ is no longer a function of
labour-market tightness. The reason is that any eﬀects of U and V via µ(U,V ) cannot be
identiﬁed separately from λ(U,V ). For the same reason, we set a = 1 in equations (6–9)
because a cannot be separately identiﬁed from µij.
The corresponding hazard functions are given by:
h
w
11(u, ¯ U,v, ¯ V ) ≡ δ11/u = µ11
uv
UV





12(u, ¯ U,v, ¯ V ) ≡ δ12/u = µ12
u¯ V
UV





21(u, ¯ U,v, ¯ V ) ≡ δ21/¯ U = µ21
¯ Uv
UV





22(u, ¯ U,v, ¯ V ) ≡ δ22/¯ U = µ22
¯ U ¯ V
UV




11,t h eλ(U,V )/u term is the average number of contacts per job seeker (andis
directly analogous to λw in the random matching model); the µ11uv/UV term is the
matching probability (andis d irectly analogous to µ in the random matching model).
Notice two things. First, hw
22/hw
12 = µ22/µ12 and hw
21/hw
11 = µ21/µ11. This means that the
job seeker’s hazardto oldemployers will d rop sharply when the job seeker becomes old
if µ12   µ22 but that the shape of the job seeker’s hazardto new employers may or may
not fall because we have no a priori view about whether µ11 ≶ µ21. This stepwise shape
in the oldjob seeker hazardwas notedin Section 2 above. Second , the hazardto old
employers will be much higher than to new employers simply because ¯ U   u.
The easiest way to proceedis to specify the logarithms of each of u, ¯ U, v, ¯ V as covariates.
We now add across competing risks:
h
w




12 =( δ11 + δ12)/u (15)
h
w




22 =( δ21 + δ22)/¯ U. (16)
The ﬁrst equation is the job seeker hazardwhen the job seeker is new andthe second
equation is when the job seeker is old. (In fact, this model is estimated as a single
regression where the four covariates are interactedwith two d ummy variables: one for
7when the job seeker is new andone for when the job seeker is old .) All of the above is
repeatedfor employer hazard s:
h
e




21 =( δ11 + δ21)/v (17)
h
e




22 =( δ12 + δ22)/¯ V. (18)
To interpret the estimates obtainedfrom this log-linear speciﬁcation in u, ¯ U,v, ¯ V ,c o n s i de r
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∂ log ¯ V
=
µ22¯ V
µ21v + µ22¯ V




Adding together the estimates for logu andlog ¯ U gives α−1 and similarly adding together




but are not shown. From the estimates on logv andlog ¯ V one can solve for µ22/µ21 twice,
using sample averages for v and ¯ V . In practice these are identical, providing the identity
V ≡ v + ¯ V holds.
The eﬀect of there being more job seekers in the market lowers the exit hazardfor the
oldjob seekers. If the increase were all new job seekers the eﬀect on the hazardwouldbe
(α − 1)u/U whereas if the increase were oldjob seekers it wouldbe ( α − 1)¯ U/U,w h i c h
is much bigger. This is simply a composition eﬀect as there are ¯ U/u times more old
job seekers looking for vacancies than new job seekers. (Each has the same eﬀect, but
expressedas an elasticity, the old“d o better”.) In fact, an increase in the number of new
job seekers can be decomposed into two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is a negative eﬀect, −u/U,a s
more new job seekers means less chance of bumping into a vacancy (market is slacker),
but this is oﬀset partially by a secondeﬀect, there being more contacts, αu/U.
There are analogous eﬀects from an increase in the number of vacancies on the market.
The ﬁrst eﬀect is that more contacts occur, ie βv/V if new and β ¯ V/ V if old. The second
is the eﬀect of new/oldvacancies on the exit probability, given a contact occurs. For new
vacancies, this component of the partial derivative is
µ21v




which is positive if µ22 <µ 21. For oldvacancies, this secondeﬀect is
µ22¯ V




8which is negative if µ22 <µ 21 (andequal andopposite to the expression immed iately above




∂ log ¯ V is smaller than it would be under random matching. However, there
is no guarantee that
∂ loghw
2.
∂ log ¯ V is exactly zero (it clearly depends on ¯ V/ vand µ22/µ21), even
under pure stock-ﬂow matching. This is because of the random nature of the contact
function: one extra oldjob seeker entering the market aﬀects the exit probability for old
job seekers even if they cannot match (µ22 =0 ) . 11 It is also for this reason that each of
the 4 hazards depends on each of the 4 covariates, unlike the prediction noted in Section 2
above.
To emphasise, the terms involving µs only have an eﬀect if µ22  = µ21, which it is under
stock-ﬂow matching. Otherwise, it doesn’t matter whether one meets an old or new
vacancy—the exit probability, given a contact, is unaﬀected.
Exactly the same considerations apply to the other three hazards hw
1., he
.1 and he




∂ log ¯ U .
There is a better interpretation of the model when it is reparameterised so that the
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µ21v + µ22¯ V
≡ π2. (20)
An increase in the stock of unemployedjob seekers has the familiar eﬀect of α−1, andit
does not matter whether the extra stock comprise old or new job seekers, because the extra
eﬀect from oldjob-seekers is zero. This is speciﬁcation test of the particular statistical
model we have adopted. If we are then able to drop logu from the speciﬁcation, we then
have the non-random matching model, which itself nests the random matching model.
Three variables, logU,l o gV andlog v, generate estimates of α, β and µ22/µ21.T oo b t a i n
an estimate of β, one adds together the estimates on logV andlog v (ie π1 +π2 = β). An
estimate of µ22/µ21 is given by
v
V (1 − π2)−1 − ¯ V
. (21)
Part of the test of the random matching model is whether new vacancies have any eﬀect on
the hazardover andabove that of all vacancies, ie whether v is signiﬁcant andpositive; it
is clear that a test of H1 : π2 = 0 is equivalent to H1 : µ21 = µ22 because µ22/µ21 =1i fH1
is true. The advantage of this approach is that we are able to test for stock-ﬂow matching
11This might seem a weakness of this particular statistical matching model, but cannot be investigated
unless separate data on contacts and matches is available.This is deferred to future research.
9with a Waldtest using a heterosced astic robust (Huber-White) covariance matrix. In
the previous parameterisation one wouldhave to test stock-ﬂow matching by comparing
log-likelihoods, which is invalid in the presence of heteroscedasticity. (The reasons why
we almost certainly have heteroscedasticity are discussed later.)
Using expressions similar to Equations (20–21), the new job-seeker hazardd elivers esti-




1. =l o gµ +( α − 1)logU + β logV (22)
logh
w
2. =l o gµ +( α − 1)logU + β logV (23)





w =l o gµ +( α − 1)logU + β logV (24)
Note that these 2 further restrictions are not part of the test: here we are testing whether
α and β are the same across oldandnew variants (although it implicitly imposes the
thirdequality in H0).
Analogous considerations apply to employer hazards, giving the equivalent random match-
ing model if all 6 equivalent restrictions hold:
logh
e =l o gµ + αlogU +( β − 1)logV. (25)
4 The data
T h eda t aw eh a v ea to u rdi s p o s a lw e r ede s c r i b e d i nt h ep e n u l t i m a t ep a r a g r a p ho ft h e
Introduction. In this ﬁrst subsection we give some of the institutional background to
the youth labour market in the UK in the late 1980s. In the following subsection we
describe in some detail the information we observe. In Section 5, we deﬁne the empirical
counterparts that are need edto test stock-ﬂow matching, namely the oldandnew stocks
U, ¯ U, u, V , ¯ V ,a n dv above, andthe ﬂow of oldandnew matches, correspond ing to δij
above.
4.1 Institutional Background
The collapse of the youth labour market in the UK in the early 1980s ledto the introd uc-
tion of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) in 1983.12 It has remainedin place ever since,
12Fuller details are given in Andrews et al.(2001 b), from which this subsection is taken.
10albeit in several disguises. The YTS is not a homogeneous programme; it can be seen as
a route to a wide variety of skilled occupations, or seen as a work-experience programme
designed to mop up the excess supply of youth labour. Since its introduction, at the
age of sixteen youths can choose between four labour-market activities: diﬀerent types
of YTS, continue their education, get a job or become unemployed. Employers can also
choose whether to recruit youths via the YTS or directly into a job.
The Careers Service fulﬁlls a similar role for the youth labour market as Employment
Oﬃces and Job Centres provide for adults. Its main responsibilities are to provide voca-
tional guid ance for youths andto act as an employment service to employers andyouths.
The latter includes a free pre-selection service for employers. Use of the Careers Ser-
vice is voluntary for employers with job vacancies, whereas notiﬁcation of YTS vacancies
is compulsory, so that the government oﬀer of a guaranteedplace for all 16-17 year old
youths can be monitored. Having notiﬁed the Careers Service of the type of vacancy—the
occupation, the wage, a closing date for applications and selection criteria—job seekers
are selected for interview. In other words, a contact is made. Either a match occurs or
the pair each continue their search.
The data we use are the computerised records of the Lancashire Careers Service (LCS).
The LCS holds records on all youths agedbetween 15 and18, includ ing those who are
seeking employment. We observe every vacancy notiﬁedby employers to the Careers
Service between March 1988 andJune 1992. All YTS vacancies andabout 30% of job
vacancies are notiﬁedto the Careers Service. Job vacancies for which the Careers Service
is not the method of search are not included in the data. Job vacancies require both high-
andlow-quality job seekers, andare representative of all entry-level jobs in the youth
labour market. It follows that our data are representative of all job seekers, because we
observe all contacts between notiﬁedjob vacancies andjob seekers. This is not an issue
for YTS vacancies because all of them are notiﬁedto the Careers Service.
4.2 Observed data in the LCS database
Each contact, andtherefore each match, in the labour market coveredby the LCS d ata




• (in) Jobs (N)
11• (on) YT scheme (Y )
• School-leaver (F)
Each vacancy is ﬁlledby one of these types of job-seeker, or it is lapsedor it is censored
(almost zero in these data).
Vacancies (V ):
• Job vacancy ﬁlledvia LCS ( J)
• Job vacancy not ﬁlledvia LCS ( J )
• YT vacancy ﬁlledvia LCS ( T)
• YT vacancy not ﬁlledvia LCS ( T  )
Each job-seeker ﬁnds one of these types of vacancy, or she lapses (‘out of the labour
market’, olm) or she is censored.13 Thus all vacancies ﬁlledby LCS is d eﬁnedas
V ≡ J + T
which, when added to those not ﬁlled by LCS, J +T  , gives a total stock of ﬁlledvacancies
equal to:
J + T + J
  + T
  ≡ V + J
  + T
 .
The primary unit of observation is a contact, ordered by calendar time, labelled i =1 ,....
The binary variable mi takes the value unity if a match occurs. ci is an analogous variable
that is always unity. Associatedwith each contact is the id entity of the job-seeker w and
vacancy e (itself associatedwith an employer) andthe d ay on which the contact occurred
τ. Formally we deﬁne the set of triplets
{(w,e,τ)} = {i | W(i)=w,E(i)=e,τ},
where the variable W(i) maps each job-seeker into the contact, if any, she makes on day
τ andsimilarly E(i) does the same for vacancies. From this triplet, we ‘match in’ various
types of information. From w:
• the origin state of the job-seeker, andhence the stock of job-seekers S.T h i sv a r i e sb y
day through the duration of the job-seeker’s stay in his/her origin state, ie between
dates τ − tw and τ,w h e r e
13In some ways, a vacancy that lapses is the analogue of a job-seeker who exits ‘out of the labour
market’.
12• tw is the duration of the spell in S (measuredin d ays);
• a vector of characteristics xw.
From e:
• the origin state of the vacancy, andhence the stock of vacancies V .T h i sv a r i e sb y
day through the duration of the vacancy, ie between dates τ − te and τ,w h e r e
• te is the duration of the spell in V (measuredin d ays);
• a vector of characteristics xe;
• the wage/training allowance ω.
For vacancies not ﬁlledby the Careers Service ( V   ≡ J  + T  ), we do not observe the
information immediately above.






All of the analysis in this paper is conducted at the level of individual matches, where
typically the variable being modelled is the duration between matches for job-seekers and
between matches for vacancies. In keeping with most of the existing literature, we could
conduct aggregate analyses, where we would count the number of matches that occur in
any period t. However, it is the case that there is no extra information containedin such
analysis andso estimating aggregate matching functions generally gives similar, but less
eﬃcient, estimates andis therefore unnecessary.
Table 1 summarises, over the whole sample period, the total number of matches stratiﬁed
by the origin state of both job-seeker and vacancy. In what follows, we do not model
matches of job-seekers who are at school (F), those in jobs (N) or on training schemes
(Y ). Modelling those who are searching whilst at school will potentially bias the results
towards stock-ﬂow matching in that there will be left-censoring causing a spike at zero
durations (Andrews, Bradley & Stott 2002). On the other hand, they are part of the same
labour market and potentially compete for the same vacancies as do the unemployed, and
so are included in the risk set for vacancy hazards. We do not model those on jobs
or training schemes because we are not preparedto make arbitrary assumptions about
whether they are involved in “on-the-job” search. Because we do not model N, Y and F
job-seekers, this just leaves the two-types of match for which we observe information on
both sides of the market.
13Thus our analysis below is basedon 2761 matches between job vacancies ﬁlledvia the CS
andunemployedjob-seekers, andthe 10416 matches between YT vacancies ﬁlledvia the








where the function 1(U,J) deﬁnes a dummy variable that is unity if the match is between
an unemployedjob seeker anda job vacancy andzero otherwise. 1( U,T) is similarly
deﬁned, but for a training vacancy. The 2761 U,J matches represent exits from both
sides of the market, that is there are 2 hazards that can be estimated from this sample of
matches, an unemployment hazard hw(U,J) anda job vacancy hazard he(U,J). Similarly,
2 hazards can be estimated from 10416 U,T matches, an unemployment hazard hw(U,T)
anda job vacancy hazard he(U,T). To be able to estimate hazards from both sides of
the market using identical exits are a unique feature of these data. The risk set for the
job-vacancy hazardis 14148 LCS job-vacancy spells andthe risk set for the YT-vacancy
hazardis 36853 spells (see the rightmost column of Table 1.) Notice that the risk set
for both unemployment hazards hw(U,J)a n dhw(U,T) is the same (34659 unemployed
job-seeker spells) andsuggests that we can estimate two more hazard s for job andYT
vacancies that are not ﬁlledvia LCS, namely hw(U,J )a n dhw(U,T  ), in a competing
risks framework.14 The problem here is that we do not observe vacancy information T  
and J  for these hazards.
14Strictly speaking, the unit of observation is a spell, not a job-seeker, as some job-seekers have multiple




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































155 Old and new stocks and ﬂows
To estimate the statistical model, we need to decide how long a job-seeker or a vacancy
is on the market before it changes from being ‘new’ to ‘old’, or in Coles and Smith’s
terminology, from ‘ﬂow’ to ‘stock’. Then the aggregate stocks of job-seekers andvacancies
have to be d isaggregatedinto those who are oldandnew. The point at which this happens
is deﬁned as kw for job seekers and ke for employers, andis measuredin weeks. We refer
to the ﬁrst kw and ke weeks as the matching window.
5.1 The raw data
The data are organised into sequential binary response form (see, for example, Stewart





00...0001 if the vacancy [resp. job-seeker] exits to U,J match
00...00 otherwise
where i indexes the individual vacancy [resp. job-seeker] and s indexes duration. Es-
sentially we have an unbalancedpanel of vacancies with te
i weekly observations for each
vacancy, andan unbalancedpanel of job-seekers with tw
i weekly observations for each job








for both worker andemployer hazard s. For vacancies, there are 14148 − 2761 = 11387
spells when the ﬁnal yis is zero, whereas for unemployedjob seekers, there are 34659 −
2761 = 31898 spells (see Table 1).
5.2 Old and new ﬂows
If, for example, ke = kw = 4 weeks, then the ﬁrst 4 zeros correspondto when the vacancy
or job seeker is “new”, for which we deﬁne the following dummy variables: 1(s ≤ ke)
and1( s ≤ kw). The cross-tabulations given in Table 2 describe almost all there is to
know about these data. Thus we deﬁne m11 as the number of matches between a new
job-seeker, ie who has been unemployedfor less than kw days, and a new vacancy, ie one































From the cross-tabulations, we can see there are m11 = 420 ﬂow-ﬂow matches, m12 = 191
and m21 = 1467 ﬂow-stock matches, and m22 = 683 stock-stock matches. These four
numbers total the n1 = 2761 matches.
Table 2: Who matches who?
new old total
Vacancies
zeros 38653 97419 136072
censored (last obs of spell is 0) 53 131 184
exits to new job seeker (last ...1) 420 191 611
exits to old job seeker (last ...1) 1467 683 2150
Total 40593 98424 139017
Unemployed
zeros 125456 371736 497192
censored (last obs of spell is 0) 1550 3983 5533
exits to new vacancy (last ...1) 420 1467 1887
exits to old vacancy (last ...1) 191 683 874
Total 127617 377869 505486
All of the above is repeatedfor the n2 = 10416 matches between unemployedjob seekers
andtraining vacancies.
5.3 Old and new stocks
During a given week t − 1, there is an inﬂow v
+
t−1 into stock of vacancies Vt−1,a n da n
outﬂow v
−
t−1, such that the stock at the beginning of week t is given by:





This equation disaggregates into expressions for job vacancies and training vacancies:










17This is the familiar identity that the change in the stock equals the net inﬂow. The job




where lt(J) is the number of job vacancies which are lapsedor whose spell is censored .
This applies only to vacancies that are ﬁlledthrough LCS, andthere is another expression
for training vacancies T. The vacancy stock data are a stock sample. In other words, all
the components of Equation (26) are observedin the LCS d ata.
Similarly, during week t − 1 ,t h e r ei sa ni n ﬂ o wu
+















where lt(U) is the number of unemployedwho ‘lapse’ (exit the labour market) or whose
spell is censored.
Unfortunately, the unemployment data are a ﬂow sample, which means that Ut is not
observed. However, we observe job-seeker data for about three years before the sample





each period. Given that week t = 1 is in April 1988, this means that U−30 is set to zero.
Another implication of having a ﬂow sample is that for the ﬁrst year (1988–89), the stock
only refers to new entrants onto the market, namely the cohort of Year 11 leavers in 1988
(hereafter the ‘1988 cohort’). This comprises mainly 16-year-olds. For the second year
(1989–90) the stock refers to both the 1988 and1989 cohorts (mainly 16 and17 year-
olds). In a sense this does not matter, as the stocks still correspond to the ﬂows. In other
words, in the ﬁrst year, mt(U,J), J and U all refer to the 1988 cohort; in the secondyear,
mt(U,J), J and U all refer to the 1988 and1989 cohorts; andonly in the thirdyear will
the data refer to everybody in the youth labour market. See Figure 1.
Alternative oﬃcial sources of unemployment andvacancy stocks are available but cannot
be disaggregated into old and new stocks.15 When we plot the NOMIS U-stocks (16/17
year-olds, monthly) versus LCS U-stocks (observedd aily, but plottedat monthly intervals)
over time, we can see this eﬀect, where they basically coincide from 1989–90 onwards
(Figure 2).16 The other noticeable thing is the very close correspondence, even at the
15As these are from the Online Information Service (NOMIS), they are referred to as NOMIS data
(http://www.nomisweb.co.uk).They originate from the Oﬃce of National Statistics.
16NOMIS data refer to 16–17 year-olds and 18+ year-olds, and so we cannot create series for 16–18
year-olds.
18endof the sample, where one might expect the recursive nature of measurement error
to have its largest eﬀect. This is convincing evidence that our stocks are extremely well
measured, and of course the LCS data, being job-seeker based, reﬂect the large inﬂow
of school-leavers onto the market between April andJune each year. The NOMIS d ata,
being claimant-based, miss this feature of the data.








t−1]+[ Ut−1 − u
−
t−1|Ut−1] ≡ ut + ¯ Ut.
The ‘new’ stock ut of unemployedare d eﬁnedas the inﬂow of unemployedd uring the






t−1 andthe ‘old ’ stock
¯ Ut are d eﬁnedas the stock of unemployedat the endof the previous week less those who
also exit during the current week, namely Ut−1 − u
−









t−1|Ut−1, that is, all those who exit during week t − 1 must either
be from the inﬂow in the same week u
+
t−1 or from the stock at the beginning of the week
Ut−1. Because the data are weekly, clearly kw = 1 week in this example, but the above

























t + ¯ U
k
t .
Analogous expressions for job andtraining stocks also exist. Notice that we ad opt a
diﬀerent terminology to Coles and Smith: we refer to their ‘ﬂow’ uk
t as ‘new stock’ and
their ‘stock’ ¯ Uk
t as ‘oldstock’, correspond ing to ‘oldﬂows’ and‘new ﬂows’ that have
already been deﬁned in Section 5.2 above.
5.4 Old and new (raw) hazards
The total outﬂow, over the whole sample period, from job vacancies is (2761 in the data)























The stocks of V ≡ v + ¯ J and U ≡ u + ¯ U are calculatedby counting the “at risk” total
in the sequential binary response form (see Table 2). In fact, if one just counts the zeros,
this is exactly the same number as the aggregate stocks over the whole sample period.
Dividing by the number of periods (221 weeks) gives the average stock.
19Hence the raw vacancy hazardto new unemployedjob seekers is given by:
h
e
11 = 420/40593 = 0.0103
h
e
12 = 191/98424 = 0.00194
andthe raw vacancy hazardto the oldunemployedjob seekers is given by:
h
e
21 = 1467/40593 = 0.0361
h
e
22 = 683/98424 = 0.00694
Thus
average stock of new job vacancies = 40593/211 = 184, and
average stock of oldjob vacancies = 98424/221 = 445.
Notice that the drop in the hazard for vacancies matching with old unemployed job seekers
is he
22/he
21 = µ22/µ21 =0 .192 is perfectly consistent with stock-ﬂow matching.
The total outﬂow, over the whole sample period, from unemployed job seekers is the same
number of matches (2761), but is a diﬀerent expression




















21 ¯ U + h
e
22 ¯ U
Hence the raw unemployment hazardto new job vacancies is given by:
h
e
11 = 420/127617 = 0.00329
h
e
21 = 1467/377869 = 0.00388
andthe raw unemployment hazardto the oldjob vacancies is given by:
h
e
12 = 191/127617 = 0.00150
h
e
22 = 683/377869 = 0.00181.
Thus
average stock of new unemployed= 127617/221 = 577, and
average stock of oldunemployed= 377869/221 = 1710.
Here the d rop in the hazardfor unemployedmatching with oldvacancies is hw
22/hw
12 =
µ22/µ12 =1 .208. This, of course, is not consistent with stock-ﬂow matching. However,
remember that this subsection simply illustrates the data for an arbitrarily chosen four
week window.
205.5 Which window-size?
It is tempting to suggest that stock-stock matches shouldbe less common than the other
three types of match; we explainedin Section 3 why this neednot be so. This is clearly
not true when kw = ke =4 ,a n ds ot h eﬁ r s ti s s u et h a tn e e d st ob er e s o l v e di sh o ww e
choose values of kw and ke so that the stock-ﬂow matching model is given the best chance
to work. Note that none of Coles & Smith (1998), Gregg & Petrongolo (1997), Coles &
Petrongolo (2001) have this problem as they use monthly aggregatedtime-series d ata.
In Figure 3, we plot the raw baseline hazards for all four hazards that we seek to estimate
later, namely hw(U,J), he(U,J), hw(U,T), and he(U,T). Although the data are weekly,
we group weeks together into the following intervals because estimation is much quicker
andthis never has any eﬀect on the estimates of the covariates. The intervals are the
same as Coles & Smith: (0,1], (1,2], (2,4], (4,6], (6,8], (8,13], (13,26], (26,39], (39,52], (52,
∞] weeks. Also d rawn are the step-wise hazardfunctions calculatedfor a 4 week wind ow
in the previous subsection.17
For unemployment, there is clear evidence of non-monotonicity, with each hazard rising
sharply to a peak at 5/6 weeks, and then declining gradually. We interpret the sharp
increase as job-seekers learning to search (visiting Careers Oﬃces, completing application
forms, learning interview techniques andso on); the subsequent d ecline partly represents
the usual duration dependence. In short, from the job-seeker hazards, there is little
evidence that the hazard declines rapidly at very short durations. However, the job
vacancy hazard is quite diﬀerent and does exhibit a rapidly declining hazard. The YT
vacancy hazardhas the same shape as the two unemployedjob-seeker hazard s, which
might well be consistent with the fact that this market is supply constrainedwhereas the
jobs market is very much the reverse. Two conclusions emerge. First, the behaviour of
the (secondary) training market is quite diﬀerent form the (primary) jobs market and it
is unlikely that stock-ﬂow matching is the appropriate paradigm, even if we ﬁnd evidence
in the jobs market. Hereafter, we estimate models for U,T matches, but only report them
in an Appendix for comparison with our main set of results.
Second, it is diﬃcult to see in Figure 3 where the optimal window size is. Hence, in
Figure 6, we plot the numbers of stock-stock, stock-ﬂow, andﬂow-ﬂow matches against
window size, but keeping kw = ke. The argument here is that it is the same search
technology being used on both sides of the market, which implies that the window should
be the same. It shouldalso be the same for the training vacancies market. It is obvious
17The original data are daily, and are plotted in Figure 4 for unemployment hazards and Figure 5 for
vacancy hazards.We actually plot all four unemployment hazards because they form a complete set of
competing risks for an unemployed job-seeker.However, we do not estimate full models for hw(U,J )
and hw(U,T  )a sJ  and T  are unobserved.
21that the number of ﬂow-ﬂow matches must increase andthat the number of stock-stock
matches must decrease. But the number of stock-stock matches is never zero, and so a
pure form of the theory does not occur in these data. The number of stock-ﬂow matches
m12 + m21 monotonically increases with window size, and then decreases monotonically.
The fact the number of stock-ﬂow matches is largest when the window size is about one
month suggests that a useful starting place is to choose kw = ke = 4 (which, coincidentally,
is the wind ow size that Coles andSmith are restrictedto in their d ata).
We experimentedwith various quasi-formal method s for trying to ﬁndoptimal values
of ke = kw  = 4, by searching over other integer values of k. For example, two simple
regressions reproduce the ﬁgures given in the two crosstabs in Table 2 and so we looked
for the k that maximisedtheir log-likelihood . Another technique was to choose k that
maximisedthe d rop in the oldhazardfor unemployedjob seekers [resp job vacancies]





12. None of these method s ledto a consistent answer, andso our conclusion is
that this search for the optimal window size is a chimera, and the appropriate strategy
is to choose a small number of (kw, ke) pairs to see whether it makes any diﬀerences to
the regression analyses, hazards, etc. In the current version of the paper, we only report
results for ke = kw = 4 weeks (but see the Appendix for what happens when ke = kw =1 ) .
5.6 Size of labour market
The data cover the whole of Lancashire, a county in the United Kingdom that comprises
14 geographically distinct towns/cities (in fact, local authority districts, or LADs). The
issue here is whether the stocks should vary by these 14 districts, being distinct labour
markets, or whether the same value shouldbe usedirrespective of where in Lancashire
the match takes place, or something in between. For the intermediate case, we grouped
Lancashire into just 3 labour markets (West, Central andEast), recognising that job-
seekers can travel between certain towns when looking for work. When we specify just
three “districts” in Lancashire, 96% of all matches take place between an unemployed job
seeker and job vacancy from the same district. This number drops to 75% when Lancashire
is treated as 14 LADs, which is convincing evidence that the 3 district speciﬁcation is the
best one. Throughout Huber/White standard errors correct for within labour-market
correlations between job-seekers/vacancies. This also why we reparameterisedthe mod el
so that our test of stock-ﬂow matching is basedon Waldrather than LR type tests.
Figures 7 and8 plot oldandnew stocks of job vacancies andunemployedjob seekers
for the 3 LADs. As wouldbe expected , the plots of new unemployedstocks is much
more stationary than the oldstock; the same is true for vacancy stocks. It is clear that
22the peaks in both new andoldunemployedarise from young people leaving school in
May/June each year (the so-calledrecruitment cycle). The seasonal pattern in vacancies
is similar, but nowhere as pronounced, although it is noticeable that the stock of new
vacancies tends to precede the months when school-leavers actually leave school.
6 Econometric methodology
The hazardfor each week s andfor each job-seeker i is modelled as follows. We assume
proportional hazards and introduce a positive-valued random variable (or mixture)  :
h
w











s is the baseline hazard, and does not vary by i. εw
i ≡ log w
i has density fw
ε (εw), andis
a job-seeker speciﬁc random eﬀect. There are identical expressions for vacancy hazards,
but with superscript e.
The likelihood Li(β,γ) for each job-seeker with observedcovariates x 
is in this ‘mixed




















isβ + γs + εi)].
where, for notational clarity, we have suppressedthe superscript w, andso the same equa-
tion also applies to the employer hazard. Because of the proportional hazards assumption,
the covariates aﬀect the hazardvia the complementary log-log link. The γss are inter-
pretedas the log of a non-parametric piece-wise linear baseline hazard , as γs ≈ log¯ hs
when x 
isβ =0 .T h eγs are collectedinto a vector γ. Each interval corresponds to a week,
but, because of data thinning, these are grouped into longer intervals at longer durations
(by constraining the appropriate γss) (see Section 5.5 above). This is because estimating
models with unobserved heterogeneity proved to be too demanding of the data.18 In the
current set of results we use Gaussian mixing, with variance σ2.19
The speciﬁcation for x 
is was discussed at length in Section 3. To recap, we deﬁne a
dummy variable for whether the spell index s is less than the window size 1(s ≤ k), and
its complement 1(s>k ). This is then interactedwith the covariates.
18We have investigated the eﬀect of using weeks rather than days.The aggregation bias is minimal
and models with daily baseline hazards simply cannot be estimated with unobserved heterogeneity.
19We have estimated models with non-parametric Heckman-Singer hazards, but the results are very
similar.Gaussian mixing is much quicker to converge.
231(s ≤ k)logU,1 ( s ≤ k)logu,1 ( s ≤ k)logJ,1 ( s ≤ k)logj
1(s>k )logU,1 ( s>k )logu,1 ( s>k )logJ,1 ( s>k )logj
It is worth emphasising that both stocks vary by duration s andjob-seeker/vacancy i,
because they vary through calendar time and because each job-seeker/vacancy enters
the market place at diﬀerent calendar times. As just noted, instead of having just two
dummies for the baseline hazard 1(s ≤ k)a n d1 ( s>k ), we estimate the unrestricted
version just discussed.
Temporal aggregation bias is an important issue in this literature, andis d iscussedat
length by Burdett, Coles & van Ours (1994), Gregg & Petrongolo (1997) and Coles &
Petrongolo (2001). In the context of monthly data, the problem arises in not observing
the instantaneous hiring rate, but rather ﬂows over a discrete period (a month). The
assumptions one needs to adjust the stock measures depend on how quickly agents are
matching, which itself is being modelled, and so there is a simultaneity bias. Coles &
Petrongolo (2001) estimate matching functions using a quite sophisticatedtechnique that
deals with this problem. In our data this will not be problem as we observe weekly ﬂows
andstocks that also vary weekly; hadwe usedd aily stocks, the issue wouldcompletely
disappear.20
7 Results
In Table 3 we report estimates of the three basic speciﬁcations, namely random matching
andtwo types of rand om matching; the top block of three is without heterogeneity and
the bottom block is with. The non-random matching model is reported in the ﬁrst panel
of both blocks. We interpret the results in the context of the statistical model developed
in Section 3—see Equation (20) in particular. The impliedestimates of α, β andthe
µ-ratios are also reported.
Looking at the models without unobserved heterogeneity, the ﬁrst ﬁnding is that logu
is not signiﬁcant in the oldjob-seeker hazard , nor is log v signiﬁcant in the oldvacancy
hazard. Both variables are signiﬁcant is the new hazards. Thus our ﬁrst speciﬁcation
test of the statistical model we have adopted in partially successful, and suggests that the
appropriate non-random matching model is not one that drops all four of these variables.
In terms of classical matching elasticities α and β, the estimates are generally sensible, but
showing a slight, but signiﬁcant, degree of increasing returns to scale; this is particularly
20In future regressions, we will use daily data.Moreover, our value-added is that we can ‘test’ the
procedures proposed by Coles & Petrongolo (2001) by aggregating the data into months, and thereby
quantify the size of the bias.
24strong for matches involving old vacancies using vacancy duration data, with   α +   β =
1.575, although the standard error is bigger too.
Our simple way of testing for stock-ﬂow matching is to see whether an increase in the
number of new unemployedjob vacancies [resp job seekers] signiﬁcantly increases the




∂ logj =0 .141, but is not signiﬁcant. This converts to a point estimate for
µ22/µ21 =0 .621, but one whose 95% conﬁdence interval is suﬃciently wide that it contains
unity. In the oldvacancy hazard ,
∂ loghe
.2
∂ logu =0 .088, but this time it is signiﬁcant. Said
diﬀerently, the implied point estimate of µ22/µ12 =0 .724 has a conﬁdence interval that
does not contain unity.
These results provide some evidence that the hazards drop slightly when a job seeker or
vacancy becomes oldwhen matching to an oldagent on the other sid e of the market. The
estimates are not precisely estimated, because this test relies on correlations between the
stocks of market participants and the number of individual-level matches. The old and
new stocks in our data are basically three time-series for each stock, one for the three
districts in Lancashire — there is little cross-section variation in the data. However, the
time-series variation is considerable because of the so-called recruitment cycle (Figures 7
and8).
25Table 3: Estimatedhazard s for unemployedjob-seekers andjob vacancies, non-rand om
andrand om matching mod els with andwithout unobservedheterogeneity, 4-4 wind ow ∗







logu -0.118 (0.055) -0.092 (0.102) -0.140 (0.079) 0.088 (0.040) 192
logU -0.169 (0.030) -0.299 (0.130) 0.683 (0.138) 0.796 (0.279) 759
logj 0.415 (0.157) 0.141 (0.101) -0.301 (0.098) -0.029 (0.188) 58
logJ 0.057 (0.234) 0.381 (0.075) -0.072 (0.101) -0.280 (0.244) 216
α, β 0.713, 0.472 0.609, 0.522 0.543, 0.627 0.884, 0.691
α + β 1.185 (0.079) 1.131 (0.049) 1.170 (0.023) 1.575 (0.229)
µ12/µ11 =0 .275 µ22/µ21 =0 .621 µ21/µ11 =1 .944 µ22/µ12 =0 .724b
[0.008] [0.163] [0.077] [0.029]
Log likelihood -16741.0 -12115.1
logU -0.281 (0.057) -0.371 (0.102) 0.544 (0.081) 0.892 (0.273) 759
logJ 0.336 (0.127) 0.480 (0.040) -0.281 (0.066) -0.302 (0.189) 216
α + β 1.055 (0.101) 1.108 (0.064) 1.264 (0.024) 1.590 (0.210)
Log likelihood -16754.1 -12137.1
logU -0.350 (0.086) 0.641 (0.130) 759
logJ 0.451 (0.059) -0.289 (0.089) 216
α + β 1.100 (0.050) 1.353 (0.063)
Log likelihood -16756.5 -12150.4
With unobserved heterogeneity
logu -0.113 (0.060) -0.086 (0.048) -0.234 (0.058) -0.215 (0.061) 192
logU -0.176 (0.092) -0.321 (0.057) 0.940 (0.078) 1.383 (0.102) 759
logj 0.424 (0.111) 0.146 (0.055) -0.181 (0.082) -0.084 (0.100) 58
logJ 0.048 (0.099) 0.393 (0.051) -0.170 (0.077) -0.299 (0.105) 216
Variance (σ2) 0.415 (0.096) 3.954 (0.297)
α, β 0.711, 0.472 0.593, 0.539 0.706, 0.649 1.168, 0.617
α + β 1.184 (0.080) 1.132 (0.048) 1.355 (0.069) 1.785 (0.090)
µ12/µ11 =0 .267 µ22/µ21 =0 .611 µ21/µ11 =3 .994 µ22/µ12 =3 .328
[0.000] [0.008] [0.000] [0.000]
Log likelihood -16730.1 -11619.2
logU -0.283 (0.059) -0.388 (0.038) 0.682 (0.052) 1.123 (0.070) 759
logJ 0.335 (0.063) 0.494 (0.034) -0.283 (0.052) -0.356 (0.073) 216
α + β 1.052 (0.073) 1.106 (0.046) 1.399 (0.063) 1.768 (0.087)
Variance (σ2) 0.414 (0.096) 3.832 (0.293)
Log likelihood -16743.2 -11637.4
logU -0.363 (0.032) 0.842 (0.047) 759
logJ 0.461 (0.030) -0.314 (0.047) 216
α + β 1.098 (0.039) 1.528 (0.058)
Variance (σ2) 0.400 (0.095) 3.847 (0.294)
Log likelihood -16746.2 -11652.7
Observations 505486 139017
∗Estimates based on 2761 matches (1887 to new vacancies and 874 to old vacancies, 611 to new
unemployed and 2150 to old unemployed) between 34659 unemployed job-seeker spells (26114 job-
seekers) and 14148 LCS job vacancies (9555 orders).
aUnlogged means are not the same as in Section 5.4 as they are weighted averages across 3 LADs.
bThe µ-ratios calculated from Equation (21) and analagous expressions.We do not report standard
errors, as the µ-ratios are not Normally distributed.By deﬁnition, p-values are the same as for
underlying parameter estimates.
26It is worth emphasising that our test has nothing to do with shape of agents’ baseline
hazards. We think that this is a correct test of stock-ﬂow matching for the following
reason. One can conceive of the data being generated in one of two ways. First, the four
µs are the same (random matching) in which case the estimates of µ22/µ21 and µ22/µ12
wouldboth be insigniﬁcantly d iﬀerent from unity andthe estimatedhazard s wouldbe
ﬂat. The secondpossibility is where the true µ22 is much lower than the other 3 µs
(stock-ﬂow matching), in which case the two tests wouldbe rejectedandthe hazard s
would drop when the agents become old. If we observe non-ﬂat hazards in the data,
but the tests are not rejected, it must be that the hazards are not ﬂat for other reasons
(duration dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, institutional features such as beneﬁts).
This is why the estimates are diﬀerent from the raw baseline hazards earlier (Figure 3),
where, recall,  µ22/µ12 =1 .208 and  µ22/µ21 =0 .192.
To investigate this further, we re-estimatedthe mod els using Gaussian unobservedhet-
erogeneity, which are reportedin the bottom half of Table 3. The eﬀect on the job-seeker
hazards is minimal, but is quite strong on the other side of the market. Repeating
the above calculations shows that there is no longer evidence of stock-ﬂow matching,
 µ22/µ12 =3 .328, andin fact one rejects H1 : µ12 = µ22 in favour of µ22 being bigger, not
smaller, than µ12. Another eﬀect of modelling the unobserved heterogeneity is that now
the baseline hazardis ﬂatter (Figure 9), which is consistent with the movement in the
estimate of µ22/µ12 between the models with and without heterogeneity, and also suggests
that the sharp fall in the vacancy hazards in the ﬁrst month is due to unobservables and
not stock-ﬂow matching (Figure 5). However, more needs doing here, as we have a rich
set of covariates from both sides of the market that might be added to these regressions.
Also notice that our data come from the diﬀerent sides of the same market, whose only
relationship with each other is that the number of exits coincide. So do the results concur?
The slightly disappointing conclusion is perhaps not: the matching elasticities tend to be
bigger when using vacancy data. Moreover, one can obtain estimates of any µ-ratio from
both sides of the market. For example, from the top block of Table 3 we can get two
diﬀerent estimates of µ22/µ11
 µ22/µ11 =( µ12/µ11)(  µ22/µ12)=0 .275 ∗ 0.724 = 0.199
 µ22/µ11 =( µ22/µ21)(  µ21/µ11)=0 .621 ∗ 1.944 = 1.207.
It looks as if the two estimates are diﬀerent, although it is diﬃcult to actually test whether
this is so (a bit a like a cross-equation in simultaneous equations models). The same is
repeatedfor the bottom block of Table 3:
 µ22/µ11 =( µ12/µ11)(  µ22/µ12)=0 .267 ∗ 3.328 = 0.889
 µ22/µ11 =( µ22/µ21)(  µ21/µ11)=0 .611 ∗ 3.994 = 0.970.
27The secondandthirdpanels in Table 3 report estimates of the classical rand om matching
model, all of which, look perfectly consistent with the existing literature (except for the
increasing returns to scale). They obviously do not diﬀer much from the corresponding
stock-ﬂow matching models as we only ﬁnd weak evidence of favour of the latter.
Finally, in the Appendix, we report corresponding estimates for a 1 week window. By
deﬁnition, the number of matches involving new agents must fall (Figure 6) as do the old
stocks ¯ U and ¯ V . The results are not at all convincing, with standard errors much higher
compared with the 4-week windows, and the corresponding point estimates are therefore
less plausible. In particular, the estimates on the µ ratios from the vacancy hazards are
particularly disappointing.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we report preliminary estimates of job-seeker andemployer hazard s using
micro-level data from both sides of a single market. In particular, we examine whether
there is any evidence in favour of Coles & Smith’s stock-ﬂow matching model, or whether,
alternatively, the random matching model adequately describes the data. Our test is a
simple one. We focus on the job seeker hazardwhen the job seeker becomes old , whose
covariates are the stock of market participants, namely the stock of unemployedjob seekers
and the stock of vacancies. This describes the classical random matching estimated many
times in the literature with aggregate data. We then add the stock of new vacancies, and
see whether it has any impact on the hazardof getting a job over and above the eﬀect of
the stock of all vacancies. If the eﬀect is positive andsigniﬁcant, this suggests that job
seekers ﬁndit hard er to match to oldvacancies once they become oldthemselves. Exactly
the reverse applies to the oldvacancy hazard , where the test examines the eﬀect of the
stock of new job seekers. The test does not examine whether the vacancy hazard or job
seeker hazards fall at certain durations, because this can happen for other reasons.
Our tentative results ﬁnd very weak evidence of stock-ﬂow (or non-random) matching.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we report what happens when the matching window is reduced to one
week from four, andthe correspond ing regressions for matches between unemployedjob-
seekers andtraining vacancies.
31Table A.1: Estimatedhazard s for unemployedjob-seekers andYT vacancies, non-
random and random matching models with and without unobserved heterogeneity, 4-4
window∗







logu 0.479 (0.074) -0.007 (0.121) 0.437 (0.342) -0.149 (0.080) 192
logU -0.656 (0.094) 0.046 (0.180) 0.689 (0.470) 0.981 (0.107) 759
logt -0.009 (0.056) -0.027 (0.012) -0.126 (0.102) 0.026 (0.051) 206
logT 0.779 (0.338) 0.906 (0.192) 0.134 (0.358) -0.003 (0.245) 1486
α, β 0.823, 0.770 1.039, 0.879 1.126, 1.008 0.832, 1.023
α + β 1.592 (0.327) 1.918 (0.226) 2.134 (0.485) 1.854 (0.276)
µ12/µ11 =1 .069 µ22/µ21 =1 .234 µ21/µ11 =0 .246 µ22/µ12 =2 .052b
[0.866] [0.030] [0.202] [0.064]
Log likelihood -48248.6 -54117.5
logU -0.141 (0.062) 0.027 (0.065) 1.247 (0.112) 0.855 (0.075) 759
logT 1.145 (0.338) 0.860 (0.190) 0.266 (0.365) -0.028 (0.260) 1486
α + β 2.005 (0.391) 1.888 (0.211) 2.512 (0.476) 1.826 (0.254)
Log likelihood -48376.2 -54190.2
logU -0.028 (0.050) 0.936 (0.054) 759
logT 0.938 (0.217) 0.057 (0.298) 1486
α + β 1.910 (0.258) 1.993 (0.314)
Log likelihood -48392.3 -54258.2
With unobserved heterogeneity
logu 0.479 (0.033) -0.007 (0.025) 0.001 (0.051) -0.308 (0.021) 192
logU -0.656 (0.045) 0.046 (0.030) 1.290 (0.078) 1.648 (0.037) 759
logt -0.009 (0.012) -0.027 (0.008) -0.112 (0.027) 0.037 (0.008) 206
logT 0.779 (0.062) 0.906 (0.034) 0.411 (0.095) -0.006 (0.057) 1486
Variance (σ2) 0.000 (0.001) 1.274 (0.051)
α, β 0.823, 0.770 1.039, 0.879 1.291, 1.299 1.340, 1.031
α + β 1.592 (0.056) 1.918 (0.033) 2.590 (0.086) 2.371 (0.051)
µ12/µ11 =1 .069 µ22/µ21 =1 .234 µ21/µ11 =0 .996 µ22/µ12 =1 4 .463
[0.428] [0.000] [0.991] [0.000]
Log likelihood -48248.6 -51797.0
logU -0.141 (0.029) 0.026 (0.022) 1.211 (0.050) 1.301 (0.028) 759
logT 1.146 (0.052) 0.865 (0.032) 0.278 (0.075) 0.089 (0.051) 1486
α + β 2.005 (0.050) 1.891 (0.032) 2.488 (0.072) 2.390 (0.048)
Variance (σ2) 0.016 (0.034) 1.285 (0.052)
Log likelihood -48376.1 -51904.9
logU -0.030 (0.018) 1.282 (0.026) 759
logT 0.946 (0.028) 0.135 (0.046) 1486
α + β 1.915 (0.027) 2.417 (0.042)
Variance (σ2) 0.034 (0.035) 1.281 (0.053)
Log likelihood -48391.8 -51908.2
Observations 505486 962263
∗Estimates based on 10416 matches (1746 to new vacancies and 8670 to old vacancies, 3023 to
new unemployed and 7393 to old unemployed) between 34659 unemployed job-seeker spells (26114
job-seekers) and 36853 LCS YT vacancies (4346 orders).
aUnlogged means are not the same as in Section 5.4 as they are weighted averages across 3 LADs.
bThe µ-ratios calculated from Equation (21) and analagous expressions.We do not report standard
errors, as the µ-ratios are not Normally distributed.By deﬁnition, p-values are the same as for
underlying parameter estimates.
32Table A.2: Estimatedhazard s for unemployedjob-seekers andjob vacancies, non-rand om
andrand om matching mod els with andwithout unobservedheterogeneity, 1-1 wind ow ∗







logu -0.237 (0.125) -0.102 (0.093) -0.180 (0.088) -0.054 (0.106) 52
logU 0.342 (0.170) -0.313 (0.129) 0.662 (0.120) 0.752 (0.255) 759
logj 0.270 (0.126) 0.214 (0.084) -0.004 (0.062) -0.063 (0.082) 19
logJ -0.314 (0.218) 0.348 (0.092) -0.271 (0.044) -0.254 (0.150) 216
α, β 1.105, -0.044 0.585, 0.562 0.482, 0.725 0.698, 0.683
α + β 1.061 (0.125) 1.148 (0.028) 1.207 (0.086) 1.381 (0.088)
µ12/µ11 =0 .192 µ22/µ21 =0 .244 µ21/µ11 = −0.815 µ22/µ12 =3 .965b
[0.032] [0.010] [0.041] [0.609]
Log likelihood -16719.4 -12136.7
logU 0.159 (0.099) -0.371 (0.094) 0.526 (0.069) 0.702 (0.183) 759
logJ -0.213 (0.192) 0.469 (0.058) -0.278 (0.024) -0.293 (0.124) 216
α + β 0.946 (0.112) 1.098 (0.055) 1.248 (0.058) 1.409 (0.079)
Log likelihood -16745.0 -12146.5
logU -0.350 (0.086) 0.641 (0.130) 759
logJ 0.451 (0.059) -0.289 (0.089) 216
α + β 1.100 (0.050) 1.353 (0.063)
Log likelihood -16756.5 -12150.4
With unobserved heterogeneity
logu -0.236 (0.136) -0.100 (0.032) -0.209 (0.066) -0.194 (0.038) 52
logU 0.340 (0.193) -0.328 (0.041) 0.830 (0.086) 1.103 (0.062) 759
logj 0.270 (0.215) 0.217 (0.034) 0.012 (0.075) -0.007 (0.046) 19
logJ -0.315 (0.202) 0.359 (0.036) -0.294 (0.078) -0.327 (0.062) 216
Variance (σ2) 0.410 (0.095) 3.977 (0.300)
α, β 1.104, -0.045 0.572, 0.576 0.621, 0.718 0.909, 0.666
α + β 1.059 (0.245) 1.147 (0.042) 1.339 (0.092) 1.575 (0.066)
µ12/µ11 =0 .192 µ22/µ21 =0 .241 µ21/µ11 = −0.656 µ22/µ12 = −0.729
[0.209] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
Log likelihood -16708.6 -11627.4
logU 0.158 (0.161) -0.386 (0.033) 0.643 (0.069) 0.928 (0.052) 759
logJ -0.213 (0.168) 0.481 (0.030) -0.279 (0.066) -0.326 (0.054) 216
α + β 0.945 (0.220) 1.095 (0.040) 1.364 (0.084) 1.602 (0.065)
Variance (σ2) 0.410 (0.095) 3.810 (0.290)
Log likelihood -16734.2 -11645.8
logU -0.363 (0.032) 0.842 (0.047) 759
logJ 0.461 (0.030) -0.314 (0.047) 216
α + β 1.098 (0.039) 1.528 (0.058)
Variance (σ2) 0.400 (0.095) 3.847 (0.294)
Log likelihood -16746.2 -11652.7
Observations 505486 139017
∗Estimates based on 2761 matches (888 to new vacancies and 1873 to old vacancies, 75 to new un-
employed and 2686 to old unemployed) between 34659 unemployed job-seeker spells (26114 job-seekers)
and 14148 LCS job vacancies (9555 orders).
aUnlogged means are not the same as in Section 5.4 as they are weighted averages across 3 LADs.
bThe µ-ratios calculated from Equation (21) and analagous expressions.We do not report standard
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Figure 8: New andoldunemployment stocks for 3 labour markets; 4-4 wind ow
41weeks


















































(b) LCS job vacancies, he(U,J)
homogeneous
Gaussian mixing
                                                                          
Figure 9: Non-random matching unemployment and vacancy hazards; 4-4 window
42